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USE OF EXTRANEOUS OR UNPROVED
WRITINGS IN CROSS-EXAMINATION
IN QUESTIONED DOCUMENT CASES,

WITH SOME DIGRESSIONS
By

EDWARD W.. SPENCER*

A

N ARTICLE by the present writer entitled "Spurious and Questioned Documents" appeared in the MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW for
April, 1917. It dealt almost exclusively with the legal phases of the
subject, and particularly with the competency of writings other than the
questioned one as standards of comparison in proving or disproving
its claimed authorship or authenticity. It touched upon the present
subject, however, only incidentally and in a general way.' It was expected at that time that the writer would prepare another paper approaching the subject of questioned documents rather more from the
standpoint of the handwriting expert or specialist, or the "examiner
:f questioned documents" as he is called in these progressive days
when real estate agents are "realtors," undertakers are "morticians,"
and justices of the peace are "jurists," almost without exception.
Though something was done toward writing it, pressure of other things
intervened, as did the growing conviction that the subject was much too
broad and technical to admit of any very useful general survey within
reasonable or available limits of space. Furthermore the technical field
has been so admirably covered by Mr. Osborn's work on questioned
documents, 2 recently supplemented, especially for the legal profession,
by his book, The Problem of Proof,3 that it would seem more pre* Of the Milwaukee Bar.
'I MARQUETm LAW REVIEW p. 114, and particularly pp. 135, x36 as to the
present subject.
=Questioned Documents, by Albert S. Osborn (ioo), with an introduction
by Dean John H. Wigmore. A new edition of this book is now in press and
is expected to be reviewed in the June issue. A few references to this edition
by- chapter members are from a list of them kindly furnished by Mr. Osborn.
'Second edition, 1926. See 3 Jones, Comm. on Ev. (2nd Ed.) Sec. 1274.
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sumptuous now than ever to much invade the technical field of the
expert.
In view of the foregoing the present discussion is confined, save for
a few incidental digressions, largely for the purpose of bringing the
Wisconsin case law as to questioned documents down to date somewhat in the light of recent legal developments elsewhere, to the narrow
but sometimes important question of whether and to what extent, at
common law and under statutes, extrinsic writings or those not 'already
in the case as genuine, may be used on cross-examination to test the
knowledge, skill, and credibility of a witness, lay or expert, testifying
for or against a document, the genuineness or authenticity of which
is in issue or relevant to the issue.
It is well to remember that witnesses with respect to questioned handwriting or documents are generally assigned to one of the three following classes:
I. Those who testify, whether as attesting witnesses or otherwise,
that they actually saw the document in question made or executed.
These are often described as eye-witnesses or fact witnesses, as distinguished from those of the next two classes, and their testimony is
often called direct.
II. Lay witnesses, or those .who testify from previously acquired
knowledge of, or familiarity with, the hand of the person whose chirography is in dispute, and whose opinion is therefore based upon a comparison of the questioned writing with a pre-existing mental standard
or exemplar. One who testifies from memory of the fact that he himself wrote or executed a document belongs to the preceding class, but
otherwise he belongs to this one.
III. Experts, or those specially skilled and experienced with respect
to handwriting or other matters affecting the origin or authenticity
of documents either generally or in some relevant particular, and whose
opinions or statements are based upon comparison (juxtaposition seems
the better word) with competent and admissible standards, or upon
such inherent peculiarities of the questioned document independent of
any standard in the ordinary or usual sense, as tend to prove some
relevant fact with respect thereto.4 While witnesses of the first class,
as stated above, are usually termed fact witnesses, those of the last two
classes- are usually classed as opinion witnesses, regardless of the fact
that in some cases, experts are no better qualified than is the jury to
draw conclusions from the physical facts which their expertness enables them to discover and bring before it.5 While none but experts
'As to the qualifications of witnesses of the second and third classes, the
130-134. I Wigm. Ev. (2nd Ed.) sec. 693 et seq.
'In some cases where document experts have been successfully employed,
there was no comparison or juxtaposition of hands in the strict or proper
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will be permitted to testify from juxtaposition merely, 6 the testimony
of a witness belongihg to any one of the foregoing classes in questioned
document cases is in no sense secondary to that of a witness belonging
6
to any other class under the rule requiring the best evidence. a Witnesses of both the second or third classes in a broad sense usually
testify from comparison-the former with a mental standard and the
latter with a physical one or by juxtaposition.
The question chiefly considered here does not involve, save incidentally, the competency of what may be rather losely called primary
or initial standards, or writings that must be proved or admitted to be
genuine or must be already in the case as genuine before any comparison can be made by court or jury and before an expert will be
permitted to give in evidence any opinion, at least upon his examination
in chief, based upon the comparison or juxtaposition of writings. This
matter was considered somewhat in detail in the earlier article in the
sense. This was because there were no available or admissible standards, or
because the nature of the inquiry rendered standards of comparison of little
if any use. Cases of this kind may simply involve erasure, or the order
or sequence of writing, or of the age of a writing as indicated by the nature
and condition of the paper or ink, or the style or type of the writing with
respect to a certain time or period, (See Tracy Peerage Case, io Cl. & F. 154,
8 Reprint, 705) or other facts and circumstances tending to authenticate or
disauthenticate a document inferentially with or without the juxtaposition of
such document with any other writing of the claimed writer or with the writing
of any other person. For a number of suggestive instances of this character,
see 22 Corp. Jur. 652; 4 Wigm. Ev. (2nd Ed.) Sec. 2023 et seq. See also infra,
note 30; In re Jackson's Est., 215 N.Y. Supp. 230; 3 Jones, EV. (Horwitz Ed.)
sec. 556, note 17. See also infra, note 33.
Johnston v. Bee, 84 W.Va. 532, IOO S.E. 486, 7 A.L.R. 252.
'Laying aside the special rules of the common or statute law as to the necessity of calling attesting witnesses in the first instance there are, generally speaking, no favorites by presumption among the several classes of witnesses in
questioned document cases, though there has been a volume of discussion, some
of it futile, as to the relative weight or value of their testimony. The frequency
with which the testimony of attesting witnesses or other eye witnesses has
been overcome by that of persons familiar with the writing of an individual, or
by the testimony of experts, or both, particularly in will cases, sufficiently
points our meaning. See Matter of Rice, 81 App. Div. (N.Y.) 223; In re
Jackson's Est., 215 N.Y. Supp. 230; In re Oliver's Will, 1214 N.Y. Supp. 154;
In re O'Connor's Est., lo5 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 202; Baird v. Shaffer, IOI Kan.
585, 168 Pac. 836, L.R.A. i918D, 638; 2 Wigm. Ev. secs. 1514. Frequently
the strange and unnatural circumstances surrounding the alleged execution of an
instrument, or its custody or discovery, tend to impeach the testimony of eye
witnesses. See In re Oliver's Will and In re Jackson, supra. In re Cregers
Est. (Okla. 1929), "274 Pac. 3. See and compare Est. of Johnson, 170 Wis. 436.
As to the necessity of calling the alleged writer of a document to prove its
execution, see Jones, Comm. Ev. (2nd Ed.) secs. 1275, 1276.
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Review. 7 It seems advisable to say here, however, that Wisconsin, like
the federal courts and those of most of our states outside of New England adopted the common law substantially as settled by the English
courts a little less than a century ago, and which persisted therein down
to the statute of 1854, excluding as standards of comparison all writings
save ancient documents coming from proper custody and writings already in the case as genuine for some other proper and relevant purpose,
the reasons for which rule are well stated in Pierce v. ATorthey.S In other
words no writing could be proved genuine for the sole purpose of making it a standard of comparison with a disputed one. This rule, however, has been quite generally changed by statutes." Our own statute
(sec. 327.26) which quite closely follows the common type reads:
Comparison of disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be the genuine handwriting of any person
claimed at the trial to have made or executed the disputed writing, shall
be permitted to be mnade by witnesses, and such writings and evidence
respecting them may be submitted to the court or jury.10
The federal statute of February, 1913, C 79, 37 Stat. 683, is as follows:
In any proceeding before a court or judicial officer of the United
States where the genuineness of the handwriting of any person may
be involved, any admitted or proved handwriting of such person shall
be competent evidence as a basis for comparison by witnesses, or by
the jury, court, or officer conducting such proceeding, to prove or disprove such. genuineness.
'See i MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW pp. 116 et seq. Rul. Case Law pp. 995 et seq.
and notes to Gambrill v. Schooley, 63 L.R.A. 427.
814 Wis. io, per Dixon, C. J. See also MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW pp. 116
et seq. See also Stitzel v. Miller, 96 N.E. 53, 250 Ili. 72, 34 L.R.A. 1004 and
note, Ann Cas. 1912 B, 412 and note. See Fenelon v. State, 195 Wis. 416, 217
N.W. 711.
See State v. Gummer, (N.D.) 200 N.W. 20, admitting extraneous writings
wifhout statutory aid. For other courts adopting the same practice see 22
Corp. Jur. 774, notes 16, 17, and the leading case of University of Ill. v. Spaulding, 71 N.H. 163, 51 Atl. 731, 62 L.R.A. 817. See also 4 Wigm. Ev. (2nd Ed.)
sees. 2208 and 2216 and notes.
Under some statutes it is held that where the writing of A is in issue,
genuine writings of X cannot be admitted as standards to show that X was
the actual forger. See Pennisboro v. First Nat. Bank, 74 W.Va. 244, 83 S.E.
898; Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44, 16 S.W. 557. See also Peck v. Callaghan, 95 N.Y. 73, which apparently led to the New York statute of 1888 rendering the writings of X competent, (People v. Molineu.', 168 N.Y. 322, 61 N.E.
286, 62 L.R.A. 193) as they clearly would be under the Wisconsin statute
quoted above. Holding them competent, apparently upon general legal principles, see Adams v. Ristine, 138 Va. 273, 133 S.E. 126, 31 A.L.R. 1413. See
also I MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 124; 32 Oh. Ct. of App. 7.
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Prior to our own statute the competency of extrinsic writings to
test a witness on cross-examination was squarely before our Supreme
Court in Pierce v. Northey,"' whioh quite typically presents the principal
question discussed herein. In this case lay witnesses (non-experts)
for the plaintiff had testified from claimed familiarity with the signature of the defendant, that his purported signature to a certain note
in issue was genuine. It was held error to permit them to be interrogated on cross-examination as to whether his name written on sundry
separate slips of paper handed them were genuine signatures, and afterward to permit the jury over objection to examine such slips in considering their verdict, the genuineness of the signatures on such having
been neither admitted nor denied, and after defendant had testified
that none of the signatures were written by him but were prepared by
others in his presence by the use of colored tracing paper and his
genuine signature, whereby fac similes of the latter were produced.
The next came Hazelton Adrn'r v. Union Nat. Bank, 2 in which
no question of cross-examination was involved, and which definitely
aligned Wisconsin with the states adopting the common law rule as to
extrinsic standards favored, if not actually adopted, in Pierce v. Northey.
State v. Miller13 reaffirms the English rule as to extrinsic standards.
No question 'arising out of cross-examination was involved, but only
whether a writing by the defendant while in custody, done at the request of the police officers and at their dictation, was admissible against
him as part of his alleged voluntary confession of the crime of arson
to connect him with prior letters threatening the burning. The request
writing was held not to be in any proper sense a part of such alleged
confession, and not being in any sense a part of the record or admissible as part of the confession, was inadmissible for comparison with
the arson letter to prove that the latter was written by the defendant.
As stated in the opinion, however, the request writing contained the
same matter as the arson letter and both letters "contained words of
peculiar form, style, and autography." Had the admission of the test
writing been urged on the ground of its tendency to show authorship
of the arson letter by reason of such peculiarities, its exclusion would
Wis. 10.
32 Wis. 34, 47.
M47 Wis. 520, 532. Under the present statute specimens made by a defendant voluntarily and without coercion are admissible as standard of comparison with a disputed writing claimed to have been made by him. Magnuson
v. State, 187 Wis. 133, 203, N.W. 735. Standards of this kind may of course
be barred under the' rule against self-crimination unless the defendant writes
voluntarily. See People v. Molineux, -supra; Sprouse v. Com., 8I Va. 374.
22 14
1
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appear to have been wrong. This phase of the case, seems not to have
been presented, argued or considered.1 4 It seems hardly necessary to
add that peculiarities of orthography, diction and arrangement are
often great aids in throwing light upon the true origin of writings, and
particularly of anonymous writings in view of the fact that a disguised
hand is very apt to be used by those who wield a threatening, libelous,
or pus-running pen.' 5
Alesch v. Haave6 decided since the enactment of our statute previously quoted permitting the proof of extrinsic writings as standards of
comparison with questioned writings, presents squarely the question of
the admissibility of extrinsic writings to test the witness on crossexamination. Here the witnesses were evidently not experts but laymen, testifying from familiarity with the signature of the defendant
that his signature to a certain contract in issue was genuine. The witnesses were allowed over objection to be questioned on cross-ex'amination as to the genuineness of other purported signatures of defendant
to an exhibit not in evidence. This was held error, cured, however,
where the court at the conclusion of the examination, rejected the
exhibit, struck out the testimony relating to it, and directed the jury
to disregard it. The court said: "In some jurisdictions spurious signatures, or signatures on documents not in evidence, are allowed to be
exhibited to witnesses as to handwriting for the purpose of crossexamination.17 This is not the rule in Wisconsin. The court cites no
authorities for its ruling save the three Wisconsin cases already considered and our statute (not enacted when they were decided) permit"See

I
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ii9, 120,

121

140.

See 3 Jones, Ev. (Horwitz Ed.) 643 reprinting a valuable paper by Commissioner Clayberg from 2 Mich. Law. Jour. 16. See also I MARQUETTE LAW
REVIEw

121,

122.

We once read a long manuscript in which the author, frequently using
the phrase "at all," invariably wrote it a-tall. See Jones, Ev. supra; Osborn,
Ques. Doc. (2nd Ed.) particularly Chap. XXIII. See also Mlagnuson v. State,
supra in which the spelling in the address on a bomb package was "Marsfilld,"
instead of "Marshfield," and this misspelling was repeated in defendants request writings, as tending to show that the writer was familiar with the
Swedish language, defendant being in fact a Swede. See the unique case of
State v. Kent, 83 Vt. 28, 74 Atl. 389, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 990, 20 Ann. Cas. 1334,
involving the peculiarities of punctuation in the inscription on the handle of
a lawnmower and the carving on a barn door. The dictum of one of the
earlier governors of Wisconsin in that "spellin is d-n
small business," does
not always hold good. See Ried v. State, 2o Ga. 68i. The defendant habitually
wrote "hit" for it. See also Ninoff v. Hazel Green St. Bank 174 Wis. 560,
183 N.W. 673, where weight was given to the spelling of a name, and the
recent valuable case of In re Creger's Est., 274 Pac. 30, Okla. Jan. 1929.
'178 Wis. 19, 189 N.W. 155. (1922)
Citing Browing v. Gosnell, 91, Ia. 448, 59 N.W. 340. For other cases in
point see infra, notes 32 et seq.
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ting the proof or disproof of questioned writings by comparison with
standards proved genuine to the satisfaction of the court.'8 The decision in this case seems to involve a rather strict interpretation of our
statute as wholly excluding by implication all writings not so proved
as a basis of comparison, 9 and apparently leaves the law as to extrinsic
writings on cross-examination much as it was prior thereto. Of course
writings already proved genuine to the satisfaction of the court as
standards of comparison under the statute may now be shown the witness on cross-examination, but if he and counsel calling him are alert,
he will usually know what writings presented have been so proved, and
this is true of other writings "already in the case. '20 Technical reasons based upon the danger of collateral issues aside, this decision has
much to commend it since it prevents the cross-examination from dragging in by the ears a lot of miscellaneous writings, genuine or otherwise, and if genuine purposely disguised, and practically requiring the
witness, without adequate time for study and comparison with any
standard, mental or physical, to identify or distinguish them practically
instanter and frequently under light conditions and other surroundings
that are abominable for the purpose, or else lose credit with a jury that
may suspect him of incompetency or worse. If a capable and conscientious expert may sometimes err under the circumstances the predicament of the lay witness must be considerably worse. 21 Aside from
the argument based upon the danger of collateral issues, a different
rule would, as said in Pierce v. Northey, "open the door to great frauds
and unfairness in the selections to be made. Experiments might be
tried and selections made for the very purpose of tricking the witness
and the jury. The papers offered here were mere slips, having upon
'See the Wisonsin statute quoted herein as sec. 327.26 and cited in the
opinion as sec. 4189a. Stat. 1921. See also the federal statute quoted herein
and McArthur v. Citizens" Nat. Bank, 223 Fed. 1004, ioo8, 139 C.C.A. 380
and infra notes I9, 36 et seq.
"McArthur v. Citizenms' Nat. Bank, supra; Fourth Nat. Bank v. lMcArthur,
168 N.Car. 48, 84 S.E. 39, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1054. That statutes of this kind
are in derogation of the common law and hence to be strictly construed, see
Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44, 6 S.W. 557; But see Fenelon v. State 195
Wis. 416, 217 N.W, 711. Further as to this case see infra, notes 56, 57.
'The phrase "papers in the case" by some authorities includes not only
such writings as are properly in evidence for some other purpose than comparison with the disputed writing, but such other writings of the party as
are part of the record, as signed or verified pleadings, affidavits or bail bonds,
(See i MARQUETTE LAW REvIEW, 128, 129) though some courts exclude the latter
as having been made post litem motam. See 22 Corp. Jour. 784, 785. See also
Ann. Cas. 1917 B, lO71.
'See People v. Patrick, 182 N.Y. 175, 74 N.E. 843. See also infra, notes
36, 37; Fourth Nat. Bank v. McArthur, supra. But compare Page v. Hoinans,
14 Me. 478 allowing extrinsic writings.
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them the name of the party only and these nlames had been copied
by others from his genuine signature by means of colored impression
paper. A more naked and wanton trick devised to impose upon the
witness and the jury could not well be imagined; and though it was
exposed in this case, it shows the danger of receiving such papers in
evidence. '22 However, where a lay witness has -testified that his conclusion is based upon the peculiar definite habit of the party in writing his
name it has been held proper to cross-examine him by using writings
showing a departure therefrom, and if he pronounces them genuine
to ask him if it is not a departure in fact. 22a On one or two occasions
prior to Alesch v. Haave, the writer spent a rather bad few minutes
under somewhat similar methods of cross-examination. That he was
evidently correct in his answer he is inclined to attribute almost as
much to good fortune and the crude methods of the cross-examiner
as to any particular expertness on his own part in making offhand
identifications and distinctions.
Cross-examination by the use of extrinsic writings is usually unfair,
even to an expert, and should not, if the matter is sensibly viewed, tend
to weaken or strengthen his testimony in chief by showing his ability
or want of it to judge handwritings under proper circumstances and
conditions. By this mode of examination the honest and capable expert may be forced to so guard and qualify his opinions as to unproved
writings as to materially weaken his testimony in chief, particularly
with a jury, since the average jury has little appreciation of the careful
study and investigation that the formation of a correct opinion by
juxtaposition of writings often involves. 23 Almost as well test the
ability of a medical expert by his ability to diagnose the ailments and
ascertain the nature and extent of the injuries of a group of miscellaneous invalids and cripples by a hasty physical examination of them
in open court. A competent expert may well err as to the genuineness
of a signature made twenty years prior to the questioned one, 24 or during
= 14 Wis. io. The lengths to which trial courts have sometimes permitted
cross-examiners to go find further illustration in Fourth Nat. Bank v. McArthur, supra, and Travelers Ivs. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 12 S.E. 18.
22 Young v. Honner, 2 M. & Rob. (Eng.) 536. See also Bevan v. Atlanta
Nat. Bank 142 Ill. 302, 31 N.E. 679.
'See the sensible remarks of the trial judge in Colbert v. State, 125 Wis.
433, ioI N.W. 423.
See Colbert v. State, supra. The age of a writing has been held not to
effect its competency as a standard but only the weight of the testimony based
thereon. Butinan v. Christey, 297 Ia. 661, 198 N.W. 314. Compare Williams v.
Riches, 77 Wis. 569. It may be interesting to note that the selection by a
forger of a model of too early or too late a period, is sometimes his undoing as the investigation of the chronology of the hands of certain writers
sometimes shows quite marked changes, particularly in their signatures. See
Marble v. Marbel's Est., 223 Ill. App. 524, 304 Ill. 231, 136 N.E. 589.
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exhausting illness, or under unusual external conditions, or while the
writer was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.2 5 Competent experts decline to give positive opinions even in the first instance unless
they have sufficient proper standards and sufficient time for examination to warrant a reasonably safe opinion that can be fairly demonstrated. Since rulings and statutes in nearly all states now give both
parties to a handwriting controversy a practically unlimited right to
bring in and prove standards of comparison, the need of extrinsic
writings to test the opinions of witnesses on cross-examination is considerably diminished.

2

5

There is considerable conflict and uncertainty elsewhere as to the
competency of writings otherwise irrelevant and not proved or admitted
to be genuine, for the sole purpose of testing the knowledge, skill and
credibility of a handwriting witness on cross-examination. The great
weight of, authority seems clearly against it both at common law and
under decisions or statutes permitting the comparison of disputed writings with those admitted to be genuine or proved -genuine to the satisfaction of the court. In other words comparison may be made, even
under statutes of this common type, only with writings shown or 'admitted to be genuine, 26 and no distinction is usually made between lay
witnesses and experts.2 7 While it would be interesting to examine in
detail the authorities sustaining this view, their full discussion would
unduly extend this paper. We must be content, therefore, to call special
attention to McArthur v. Citizens' Bank of Norfolk, 2' and to the able
and quite exhaustive discussion in Fourth National Bank v. McArthur,29 both of which sustain the view evidently taken by our Supreme
See In re Gordoil's Case 50 N.J. Eq. 397, 26 Atl. 268.
" This matter is considered by states in 4 Wigm. Ev. (2nd Ed.) sec. 2o16.
See also Id., sec. 2o08. Aside from writings post litem mortam the extent of
the court's power to exclude or limit proved standards is not subject to any
definite rule. As to subpcena or discovery to reach standards in hands of adversary, see infra note 64.
' See infra, notes 36 et seq.
27, See, however, People v. Patrick, supra, distinguishing Hoag
v. Wright, 174
N.Y. 36, 66 N.E. 579, 63 L.R.A. 163. See also Andrews v. Hayden's Adn'r.
quoted infra, note 39.
2223
Fed. OO4, 139 C.C.A. 380. It was held in this same case that it was
not error to refuse to permit a skilled engraver to reproduce defendant's signature in the presence of the jury to show how easily it could be forged. See
also Thxmots v. State, 18 Tex. App. 313; Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150,
13 Sup. Ct. 288, 37 L. Ed. 118.
168 N.C. 48, 84 S.E. 39, Ann. Cas. 1917 B. 2054. This case, as we have
said, well shows the lengths to which trial courts have sometimes permitted
cross-examiners to go in dealing with handwriting witnesses. There evidently were both lay and expert witnesses and the trial court permitted them
to be interrogated on cross-examination as to certain signatures not in the
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Court in Alesch v. Haave ° that statutes substantially like our own exclude by implication all but genuine writings as a basis of comparison
with the questioned writing throughout the trial, as well upon crossexamination as upon examination in chief. Many other authorities are
given below more or less clearly sustaining the view that extraneous
writings, or those not in the case as genuine either at common law, or
under statutes or decisions permitting proof of genuineness for the sole
purpose of establishing standards of comparison, cannot be used in the
cross-examination of handwriting witnesses."
case as genuine either incidentally or as proved standards under a statute
similar to our own. They were in fact prepared for the occasion by one Lester, an engraver. The Supreme Court said: "Our opinion is that there was
error in permitting the witnesses of the plaintiff to be cross-examined with
regard to the signatures which were written or engraved by Mr. Lester and
exhibited to them through the aperture made in the envelope, without showing them the rest of the paper in which the signature was written it being
called in this case, rather facetiously, though not inappropriately, the "cat-hole
test." These papers should not have been admitted at all. (The italics are ours.)
They tended to introduce collateral questions; to multiply the issues, in fact,
though perhaps not in form; to divert the minds of the jurors from the real
and only question to be decided; to confuse them in their deliberations and
to put the witnesses to an unfair disadvantage and to entrap them unwarily;
and also to take the plaintiff by surprise and deprive him of a fair opportunity to know the general nature of the evidence, so that he may prepare
to meet it. It tends more to muddy the waters like the cuttlefish, than to
advance the purpose for which all judicial procedure is adopted, and that is
to conduct the trial so as to establish the truth and to adjudicate rights according to the pertinent and determinative facts, and also to adhere closely to
the issue upon which the decision should turn.
3' 178 Wis. 19, 189 N.W. 155. That statutes of this kind are in derogation
of the common law and hence to be strictly construed, see supra, note 19.
Since it is interesting and may be important to know whether the witness
was lay or expert, or was one testifying as to his own hand, the fact as to
this is indicated. See Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 218 (expert) ; State v. Griswold,
67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046, 33 L.R.A. 227 (expert), with which compare Brown
v. Woodward, 75 Conn. 254, 53 Atl. 112, (witness as to own hand) ; Wooldridge
v. State, 40 Fla. 137, 38 So. 3 (lay but decision not squarely in point) ; Massey
v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 104 Ill. 327, lay) ; Gaunt v. Harkness, 53 Kan. iii,
116 Pac. 361 (expert); Loving v. Warren County, i Ky. L. Rep. 340 (lay);
Andrews v. Hayden, 88 Ky. 455, 1I S.W. 428 (lay); Bacon v. Williams, 13
Gray (Mass.) 525; King v. Donahue, sio Mass. 155, 14 Am. Rep. 489 (lay);
Howard v. Patrick, 43 Mich. 121, 5 N.W. 84 (lay), with which compare Johnston Harvester Co. v. Miller, 72 Mich. 365, 4o N.W. 429, 16 Am. St. 536,
(expert) ; Rose v. First National Bank, 91 Mo. 399, 3 S.W. 876, 6o Am. Rep.
258, declaring rule of exclusion applicable to both kinds of witnesses); State v.
Minton, 116 Mo. 614, 22 S.W. 8o8 (lay); Hilsley v. Palmer, 32 Hun (N.Y.)
472 (expert); VanWyck v. McIntosh, 14 N.Y. 439, (lay); People v. Murphy,
135 N.Y. 455 (expert) ; People v. Patrick, 182 N.Y. 175, 74 N.E. 843 (lay),
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Among the cases taking a different view of the competency of extraneous writings the genuineness of which had not been admitted or
proved, for the purpose of testing a handwriting witness, a leading one
is Browning v. Gosnell,32 decided by one of the courts that appear to
put an unjustly low appraisal upon the value of the testimony of handwriting experts, if not upon the testimony- of experts generally, 33 or
with which compare Hoag v. Wright 174 N.Y. 36, 66 N.E. 579-63 L.R.A. 163
(expert); Fogg v. Dennis, 3 Humph. Tenn. 47 (Lay); Thomias v. State, 18
Tex. App. 213 (lay); Sanderson v. Osgood, 52 Vt. 309 (lay?); Wilmington
Say. Bank v. Waste, 76 Vt. 331, 57 AtI. 241 (lay, but same rule declared applicable to expert) ; First Nat. Bank v. Barker, 75 W.Va., 344 (lay); Alesch
v. Haave, 178 Wis. 19, 189 N.W. 155 (lay) Pierce v. Northey, 14 Wis. 1O
(lay) ; U. S. v. Chamberlain, 12 Blatchf. (U. S.) 300. See Hickory v. U. S.
15,

U. S. 303, 14 Sup. Ct. 334, 38 L. Ed. 170.

See also Schreiner v. Shanaan, O5 Neb. 525, 181 N.W. 536, excluding
extrinsic writings on cross-examination under Rev. Stat. 1913 permitting comparison by experts with standards proved genuine.
The rule in Alabama seems uncertain. In Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 636
apparently affirming the general rule against extrinsic writings, the witness
(evidently lay) was shown only part of a signature and asked whose writing it was. The specific objection was not to the writing, but to the disclosure of only part of it. This method of cross-examination was approved,
under the specific objection made, though it would seem particularly indefensible. See also First Nat. Bank v. Allen, Ioo Ala. 476, 14 So. 335, 46 Am. St.
R. 8o, 27 L.R.A. 426, where the witness testified to the forgery-of his own
signature and was tested by other papers (checks) found on the person of the
alleged forger purporting to be signed by the witness. Both these cases were
prior to the statute permitting extrinsic writings as a basis of comparison. See
N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Witte, i9o Ala. 327, 67 So. 263; H. Griffin v. WorkingWomen?'s Home Assn., 151 Ala. 597, 44 So, 6o5.
For the English cases and a review of the American cases see the quite
elaborate note to Fourth Nat. Bank v. McArthur, Ann. Cas. I9I7B, io6i. See
Royal Canadian Bank v. Brown, 27 U.C.Q.B. 41 apparently sanctioning extrinsic tests. A lay witness pronounced signatures forged which were subsequently shown to be genuine. See Griffith v. Ivory, ii Ad. & E. 322 excluding
extrinsic writings on cross-examination. Compare Young v. Howner, 2 M. &
Rob. 536 involving peculiar habit as to given name or initials in signature.
= 91 Ia. 448, 59 N.W. 340.
' See Whitaker v. Parker, 42 Ia. 585; Browning v. Gosnell, supra; Patton
v. Lund, 114 Ia. 301, 86 N.W. 340; Johnston v. Linder, 146 Ia. 441, 143 N.W.
410. See also Butmani v. Christy, 197 Ia. 661, 198 N. W. 314, 198 N.W. 314.
With such expressions as that the testimony of handwriting witnesses based
on comparison "is of the lowest order," (Browning v. Gosnell, supra) or
"weak and unsatisfactory," (Patton v. Lund, supra) and the like. (See 22
Corp. Jur. 786, 787) the experts themselves have no quarrel where they are
confined to mere unreasoned and undemonstrated opinions. "In other cases,
however, the testimony of such witnesses when rightly viewed should be deemed
to depend for its weight, in general, upon the number and character of the
writings examined and compared, and the clearness and cogency with which
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more opinion testimony as it is often erroneously called under certain
circumstances, by courts taking this unreasonably hostile attitude.34
their differences, similarities, and peculiarities are pointed out and explained. In
many cases the testimony of the expert may amount to such practical demonstration of the facts as must be absolutely decisive of the case. In this connection see Green v. Terwilliger, 56 Fed. 384; Gordon's Case, 5o N.J. Eq. 397;
Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss. 660; Reed v. Warner, 17 L.C. Rep. 491; Boyd v.
Gosser, 78 Fla. 64, 82, So. 758; In re O'Connor's Est. 105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W.
4Ol; Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468, 154 N.E. 209. In the case last cited it
is said: "While opinion evidence based upon hypothesis has been held to
be of little value, the opinion of an expert may be of great value where it
calls the attention of the court to facts which are capable of verification by
the court, which the court otherwise would have overlooked, and the opinion
of the exl~ert is based upon such facts and is in harmony therewith." See also
the recent valuable opinion in In re Creger's Est. (Okla. Jan. 1929) 274 Pac. 30.
Strange as it may seem to the uninitiated, many cases in which the facts
discovered and elucidated by experts have amounted to absolute demonstration, involved typewriting. See People v. Storrs, 207 N.Y. 147, 45 L.R.A.
(N.S.)
86o, Ann. Cas. I914C, 196; Gamble v. Second Nat. Bank (Est. of
Burt) Mich. Bar Jour. and Mich. L. Jour. Vol. VI. No. 8. No typewritten
document dated prior to the middle seventies bears authentic date, and the
same is true of any document dated prior to the manufacture of a machine
bearing the distinctive type forms appearing therein. Whole pages have been
inserted or substituted in typed documents which were plainly the work of a
machine not in existence when the original document was written and dated.
Broken or otherwise defective type, or other defects in the work have often
revealed the very machine upon which a particular document was prepared.
See Osb. Prob. of Proof, (2nd Ed.) Chap. XXV. See also Levy v. Rust,
(N.J. Eq.) 49 At. 1017; State v. Freshwater, 50 Utah. 442, 85 Pac. 447, 116
Am., St. R. 853; Lyon v. Oliver, 316 Ill. 292, 147 N.E. 25f and Dean Wigmore's
comments thereon in Ill. L. Rev. for Nov. 1926. In fact an old typewriter
is as apt to develop as many identifying characteristics as an old lady or a
Ford. See Grant v. Jack, 116 Me. 342, 102 Atl. 38 and the note to Baird v.
Shaffer L.R.A. 1918D, 652.
We add from our own experience and for the special benefit of the amateur detective and the short story writer, that a little careful use of proper
tools will create such peculiarities in a typewriter as will clearly identify its
future work.
'Our own Supreme Court has had little to say as to the weight to be
accorded the testimony of handwriting experts. In Est. of Johnson, 170 Wis.
436, it admits that the battle of the experts was interesting, but adopts the
opinion of the court below that the testimony of eye witnesses not otherwise
assailed was not to be impeached by the testimony of handwriting witnesses
who express opinions only. While the testimony of eye witnesses is entitled to
great weight, there is no rule that their testimony, even where they are attesting witnesses, cannot be overcome by that of experts, testifying to facts and
giving reasons so significant as to amount to practical demonstration or fall
little short of it. An examination of this case including the apparently reliable pictures printed in the report, leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction with
the result. For the further history of this case see 183 N.W. 888, 175 Wis. I.
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Here the witnesses were experts and the extraneous writings submitted
to them on cross-examination were both genuine and spurious signatures
which they were asked to distinguish. They were held competent
chiefly upon the authority of Johnston Harvester Co. v. Miller35 and
Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Sheppard.36 In both of these latter cases
the testimony of experts was involved, and in both of them both
spurious and genuine writings were admitted as tests on cross-examination. A few other courts have sanctioned similar procedure on the
apparent ground that handwriting experts as a class are peculiarly unreliable and that their ability should be searchingly 'and rigidly tested,
through the allowance of great latitude to that end. 7 Even in states
where cross-examination by the use of extrinsic and unproved standards is permitted, however, serious peril to the cross-examiner may be
involved in its employment. If the witness answers correctly, he invariably strengthens his testimony in chief. Even where his answers
are incorrect in whole or in part, methods of this kind may give an
impression of unfairness and trickery prejudicial to the cross-examiner,
particularly where it appears that the writings used were specially
fabricated or disguised for -the occasion. "Cat-hole" and peek-a-boo
methods with an apparently frank, honest, and intelligent witness are
especially apt to create an impression of pettifogging even where they
do not otherwise end in the discomfiture of the cross-examiner.
Where the spurious writings used are produced by some process of
drawing or tracing, a competent expert is quite likely to identify or
characterize them quite promptly unless they are very skillfully prepared in spite of -the fact that to the ordinary observer they are the
In Ninoff v. Hazel Green St. Bank, 174 Wis. 56o, 183 N.W. 673 it was

held that while the testimony of expert witnesses is entitled to full fair consideration by the jury, it is, except in a very limited class of cases not bound
thereby. Further as to this case see supra, note 15.
72 Mich. 265, 40 N.W. 429, 16 Am. St. R. 536 (Experts.) The papers shown
seems to have been already in the case though one of them was written by a
third person whose signature was not in issue.
'85
Ga. 751, 12 S.E. x8. The syllabus, which accurately reflects the ruling

in this case, is as follows: "Witnesses who have testified as experts in handwriting may be cross-examined in any appropriate way, to test their skill.
Writings and parts of writings, no matter by whom written, may be exhibited

to them for their opinion as to the identity of the handwriting with that in
question, and neither the witness nor the opposite counsel is entitled to know

what writings will be used for this purpose, or whether they are genuine or
not, or by whom they were written."
See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, supra; Thomas v. State, io3 Ind.
419, 2 N.E. 8o8 (expert); First Nat. Bank v. Allen, ioo Ala. 476, 14.
So.
335, 46 Am. St. R. 8o, 27 L.R.A. 426, party. See as party testifying as to
own hand supra, note 49. See also Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626 where only
part of a signature was shown to a lay witness.
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genuine writings of the one whose hand is in dispute. 3' However, if
the generally prevailing rule that extrinsic or unproved writings are incompetent on cross-examination is to be relaxed, it should be as against
39
the expert rather than the layman under ordinary circumstances.
Some of the cases that appear to be otherwise indistinguishable, may
be reconciled by reference to the expert or non-expert character of the
witness.40 Relaxation of the rule, even against the expert, however,
can apparently be justified solely on the basis of the general rule that
in testing the qualifications and reliability of experts, and particularly
handwriting experts, much latitude of cross-examination should be
allowed. 41 However, the method of cross-examination in question,
' See Osb. Ques. Doc. (2nd Ed.) Chapters XVII and XIX as to simulated
or copied forgeries and traced forgeries. See particularly Boyd v. Gosser, 78
Fla. 64, 82 So. 758 as to traced forgeries. See also 3 Jones, Ev. (Horwitz Ed.)
sec. 553 as to absolute as distinguished from characteristic identity as indicating
traced forgery.
In Andrews v. Hayden's Admr. 88 Ky. 455, II S.W. 428 where writings
prepared by an experienced expert were presented to test a lay witness on
cross-examination it was said: "They were executed with such skill as to
deceive any ordinary observer, or those having no other experience than their
familiarity with their neighbor and his handwriting. Such writings should have
been excluded, because tending to obstruct the proper administration of the
law, and deceiving, by skill of their execution, the minds of honest men." See
also Wilmington Say. Bank v. Waste, 76 Vt. 331, 57 Ati. 24i and cases cited,
in the next note below.
There may be some doubt as to who should be classed as lay witnesses, or
as experts. It has been held, however, that experienced bankers, testifying from
just position are experts as to whom wide latitude of cross-examination should
be allowed. Adams v. Ristine, 138 Va. 173, 122 S.E. 126, 31 A.L.A. 1413. This
case apparently makes no distinction in this respect between- the so-called practical expert and the scientific expert or professional document examined. The
former is rather more prone than the latter to give offhand opinions. See also
In re Creger's Est. (Okla. 1929).
'Peo ple v. Patrick, 182 N.Y. 175, 74 N.E. 843 (lay), distinguishing Hoag v.
Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 66 N.E. 579, 66 L.R.A. 163 (expert) ; Howard v. Patrick,
43, Mich. 121, 5 N.W. 84 (lay), with which compare Johnston Harvester Co.
v. Miller, 72 Mich. 365, 40 N.W. 429, 16 Am. St. R. 536 (expert).
For conflicting decisions in New York prior to the above, see the note to
Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1073. See also infra., note 49.
See First Nat. Bank v. Allen, ioo Ala. 576, 14 So. 335, 46 Am. St. R. 8o,
27 L.R.A. 426.
Party testifying to forgery of own signature. See also Adams
v. Ristinel 138 Va. 273, 122 S.E. 126, 31 A.L.R. 1413. Here the court distinguishes between the cross-examination of lay and expert witnesses, but the
case does not clearly indicate the precise nature of the writings or photographs
used, Browning v. Gosnell and Hoag v. Wright are cited with evident approval.
See also Fourth Nat. Bank v. McArthur, I68 N.C. 48, 84 S.E. 39, Ann Cas. i917B,
1054, and note.
412 Jones, Ev. (Horwitz Ed.) sec. 338; Hoag v. Wright, supra, Adams v.
Ristine, supra, containing valuable suggestions as to the scope of cross-examina-
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even with an expert in the strict sense, involves all the dangers and
evils of multiplication, obscuration, and befuddlement of the main
issues that exist where the witness is a layman since this mode of crossexamination would clearly avail nothing unless evidence of the authenticity or otherwise of the extrinsic writing is admitted to show that the
witness made a mistake. Indeed it is the very multiplidation, obscuration, and befuddlement that counsel employing this method seek to
create, particularly in a desperate case. The dominant idea is not to
test the witness but raise a smoke screen between the jury and the facts.
Even where cross-examination by the use of extrinsic writings is permitted the court should have considerable latitude as to the extent to
which it shall be carried and the manner in which it shall be exercised. 42 The witness, if an expert, should be given such reasonable time
and opportunity to examine and compare the extrinsic writings with
the other writings in the case as the exigencies of the trial will Permit,43 though a mere request for it may tend to weaken his honest,

well-reasoned and really correct opinion in the minds of the jurors,
who frequently have little appreciation of the painstaking and sometimes laborious processes whereby competent experts reach their conclusions in all but very plain cases. If reasonable time is requested but
cannot be allowed, the witness should not ordinarily be compelled to
answer at all.
Another apparently valid objection to the competency of extrinsic
unproved writings on cross-examination is, that the party whose writing is in dispute may make -the test writings himself in a purposely disguised or unnatural hand, and then, if the witness pronounces them
spurious and does not admit his error, prove their genuineness by other
testimony and thus get them before the jury as genuine, writings made
post litem motam, in spite of -the generally recognized and highly reasonable view that such writings are apt to be self serving and not a true
reflection of the writer's real habits they are not admissible as stand44
ards of comparison unless offered or elicited by the opposite side.
tion of handwriting witnesses, both lay and expert. See also Browit v. Woodward, and other cases cited infra., note 49.
See McArthur v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 223 Fed. 1004, 139 C.C.A. 380; Johmston Harvester Co. v. Miller, supra. On the general subject of the courts dis-

cretion see Adavis v. Ristine, supra, distinguishing between lay and expert witnesses as to scope of the examination.
'See Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 571; Demeritt v. Randall,
116 Mass. 331, Colbert v. State, 125 Wis. 433, IOI N.W. 423. Compare Brown
v. Woodward, 75 Conn. 254, 53 Atl. 111z.
See 3 Jones, Ev. (Horwitz Ed.) sec. 550; 22 Corp. Jur, 784; I MARQUETTE
LAW REVIEw 128; Doud v. Reed, 53 Mo. App. 553; Hickory v. U. S., 15, U. S.
303, i4 Sup. Ct. 344, 38 L. Ed. 170. See also the opinion in Massey v. Farmers'
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We believe that the rule adopted in Alesch v. Haave is on the whole
the safer and better one regardless of the fact that it is supported by
the great weight of authority, and in spite of the apparently contrary
view of Dean Wigmore,4" in spite of the fact that in some special eases
a greater latitude of cross-examination seems quite desirable. Usually
these will be cases where the so-called expert expressly or impliedly
asserts ability to do more than seems reasonably or humanly possible,
as to make identifications or distinguish the spurious offhand or practically instanter in much the manner of a bank teller dealing with the
checks of a depositor, 46 to determine more than relatively in most cases

the age of ink upon the paper," or where he declines or is unable to
give any reasonable grounds for his opinion. That a witness qualifies
in the ordinary manner of an expert, however, or that his expert qualifications 'are admitted, should of course not be taken as an implied
assertion of extraordinary powers distinguishing him from the generality of his kind. The graphologist, or one who claims to be able to
tell from the character of a handwriting alone whether a given penman
is characterized by benevolence or avarice, or has chronic trouble with
his bowels, seems not yet to have invaded our courts. However "the
world do move," and graphology, like the bottle high up and away
back on the Deacon's closet shelf, may possibly have "a little something
in it."

48

Nat. Bank,

104 Ill.
327, quoting i Whart. Ev. sec. 715; Wilningtoll Say. Bank
v. Waste, 76 Vt. 331, 57 AtI. 241. Even where such writings must come in,
it would seem that the court should have power to keep them out of the hands
of the jury. See, however, Royal Canadian Bank v. Brown, 27 U.C. 2. B. 41.
See also the note to Grabibrill v. Schooley, 63 L.R.A. 441.
44
Ev. (2nd Ed.) sec. 2015.
" See Groff v. Groff, 309 Pa. 603, 59 Atl. 65 where this mode of crossexamination was sanctioned with a lay witness asserting powers of positive
identification. See also Osb. Ques. Doe. (1st Ed.) 28.
"*See In re Bromley's Est., 219 N.Y.S. 701. While the extrinsic papers used
here would perhaps have been competent under Hoag v. Wright, 174 N.Y. 36,
66 N.E. 57963 L.R.A. 163, they would doubtless be regarded as competent
even in states where extrinsic writings are generally excluded. They were
court records of known age presented to the witness, not to test his ability to
identify or distinguish writings by comparison of hands, but to test his asserted
ability to determine the age of ink with respect to the several signatures upon
a questioned will. The witness refused to give an opinion when confronted
with this test.
'See Ost. Ques. Doc. (2nd Ed.) XXIV. The true expert recognizes that
even the matter of sex cannot in many cases be determined with much certainty
by the character of handwriting alone. Speaking very generally, however, the
writing of anonymous letters is a feminine rather than a masculine trick, particularly where they have a sexual coloring or background. Those of the
really threatening or Black Hand type are more apt to have masculine origin.
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A number of cases hold that a witness testifying as to his own.writing may be tested by extrinsic writings, 49 and the airy nonchalance
with which some witnesses positively deny their own signatures, particularly where their personal interests are at stake, often renders
extrinsic tests of their ability to identify their own writing quite desirable.
All, or nearly all, the.cases in which cross-examination by the use
of extrinsic unproved writings has been sanctioned are cases where
it was permitted at the trial. Had their use been denied, it is fair to
assume that reversal would not have ensued for that reason unless it
49
appeared that there was a plain abuse of discretion. a
Alesch v. Haave50 seems quite clearly to establish ,the same rule of
cross-examination for experts as well as lay witnesses, since it cites
with evident dis'approval Browning v. Gosnell,51 decided by court in
which the poor unfortunate handwriting expert seems utterly without
judicial friends. 52 In Colbert v. State,53 miscellaneous unproved writings were presented on cross-examinationi to an expert, Mr. Tyrrill,
called by the state. He very properly declined to express an opinion
as to them unless given time for their careful examination. The trial
court sustained him. This case is not in conflict with Alesch v. Haave,
since no objection was made to the use of the writings themselves, but
only to the way in which the defendant insisted that the witness should
deal with them.
We take advantage of this opportunity to touch upon a few additional matters not germane to the principal purpose of this article
principally for the purpose of covering such decisions of our Supreme
Court as have not been noticed in the preceding pages or in the earlier
article in the REVIEW.
In Ninoff v. Hazel Green St. Bank, the Supreme Court. examined
As to anonymous letters generally, see Osb. Prob. of Proof, (2nd Ed.) Chap.
XXVI, Osb. Ques. Doc. (2nd Ed.) Chap. XXIII.
"'First Nat. Bank v. Allen, ioo Ala. 476, 14 So. 325, 46 Am. St. R. 8o,
27 L.R.A. 426; Browa v. Woodward, 75 Conn. 254, 53 Atl. 112. See also Neal
v. Neal, 58 Cal. 287; Hardy v. Norton, 66 Barb. 527. Contra as to both genuine
and spurious signatures intermingled. Loving v. Warren County, 1 Ky. L. 340.
Contrary to Brown v. Woodward, supra, some courts have held that the witness is entitled to see the whole of a paper before saying whether the signature
thereto is his. North Am. F. Ins. Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich. 146, 7 Am. R. 638.
, See Colbert v. State, 125 Wis. 433, IOI N.W. 423; McArthur v. Citizens'
Nat. Bank, 223 Fed. OO4, 139 C.C.A. 380.
W
178 Wis. 19, 189 N.W. 55. Compare Colbert v. State, 125 Wis. 423, 104
N.W. 61.
S91 Ia. 448, 59 N.W. 340.
'f See supra, note 33.
Supra.
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for itself the writings involved to ascertain whether a judgment upon
a verdict should stand. This case is further considered above. 9 a
Magnuson v. State54 affirms the generally accepted rule that the
handwriting expert may give reasons for his conclusions. Whether he
gives them or not, he may undoubtedly be fully cross-examined with
respect to them. 55
In Fenelon v. State"6 the expert was permitted to testify from a
photograph of a will, after it was shown to be a true and reliable reproduction, the original will having been subsequently lost, or else abstracted from the files, and probably destroyed. This case contains
some general discussion of the admissibility of photographs in questioned document cases, and quite clearly indicates that -the future attitude of our own courts will be liberal respecting them in view of the
present high state of the photographic art."
"187 Wis. 122, 203 N.W. 749. This case has unusual interest as showing
what science can do in the detection and proof of crime, through the discovery
and elucidation of physical facts. Further as to this case see the valuable
paper by Prof. J. H. Matthews in the Report of the Wisconsin State Bar
Association, June 1924. Further as to this case see supra, notes 13, 15.
.' In addition to the cases cited in the Magnuson case see 22 Corp. Jur. 786;
I MARQUETTE LAw REvIEw 139, note 82. In Venuto v. Lizzo, 148 App. Div.
164, 32 N.Y. Supp. io66, judgment was reversed because the expert, though permitted to give his reasons, was so harassed and bedeviled by opposing counsel
that he was unable to do so in a clear and continuous manner. See also
Johnson Service Co. v. McLernon, 127 N.Y. Supp. 432, 142 App. Div. 667 and
the notes to 63 L.R.A. 166 and L.R.A. 1919D, 647.
S195 Wis. 416, 217 N.W. 711. See note to 31 A.L.R. 143 as to photographs
of inaccessible writings. See also Brown v. McKelvey, 59 Wash. 115, lo9 Pac.
337, where experts were permitted to testify from comparison of genuine signature with their recollection of the alleged forgery, where the adverse party
failed to produce it. See also Murphy v. Murphy, 146 Ia. 255, 125 N.W. 191.
In view of the high perfection of the modern photographic art, there is
now comparatively little controversy as to the admissibility of photographs,
enlarged, grouped or otherwise, provided their accuracy and fairness is proved
to the satisfaction of the court, to aid the expert in disclosing and illustrating
the facts with respect to the writings involved, such writings being actually
before the court. Further on the subject of photographs generally see Osb.
Ques. Doc. by reference to the index titles and the valuables case of Adams
v. Ristine, 138 Va. 273, 122 S.E. 126, (19) and the note thereto in 31 A.L.R.
1436; 2 Wigm. Ev. (2nd Ed.) p. io6; MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 125.
The Fenelon case shows quite clearly at least one of several cogent reasons
why a document, the moment it is questioned, or is likely to be questioned,
should be promptly and properly photographed. See Osb. Prob. of Proof,
index title, Photographs; Osb. Ques. Doc. (2nd Ed.) Chap. VI.
In the Magnuson case, no question was raised above as to the use of enlarged photographs. These were in fact quite freely used at the trial.
There seems occasionally to be a little professional or quasi professional
folderol in the use of instruments and enlarged photographs in document cases,
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Further advantage is taken of this opportunity to say that the great
service that a competent document examiner may render to individuals
and the community is not wholly appreciated by some of the legal profession, and not always by the courts. The very knowledge that such
a person has been employed often leads to the compromise or withdrawal of fraudulent or other unfounded claims, or stops the flow of
obscene, threatening, or otherwise objectionable writings that scandalize
or terrorize individuals or even entire communities. 58 His findings may
point out, even though they may not directly convict, the guilty party,
or relieve the innocent from suspicions that might otherwise involve
loss of reputation or employment or the disruption of the dearest social
and domestic ties. No honest lawyer wishes to prosecute or defend
contrary to justice and right; and the timely employment of 'anexpert
often saves him the mortification of so doing.59 Nor is there the almost
since the essential facts often lie practically upon the surface, so that their
employment seems much like using a microscope to discover and reveal the
bare fact that there are holes in Sweitzerkaese. Still, the use of such things
is often necessary, not merely to discover the facts in the first 'instance, but
as aids to the sight and understanding, particularly in jury trials. The time
seems near, even if it has not arrived, where the exclusion of photographs
fairly necessary to a proper presentation of the case will constitute reversible
error as being tantamount to a refusal to permit the witness to give reasons
for his opinion or present the actual physical facts. In the present high state
of the photographic art the older cases excluding photographs in document
cases should be relied upon with great caution. Many of them go upon failure
to adequately prove the reliability and accuracy of the pictures offered, rather
than upon the incompetency of photographs generally. For a liberal citation
of older authorities see Fourth Nat. Bank v. McArthur, cited supra, note 29.
See also 2 Wigm. Ev. (2nd Ed.) sec. 797; 31 A.L.R. 1436, and note reviewing
the cases.
As sanctioning use of chart or blackboard by an expert to illustrate and
explain his testimony, see McKay v. Lasher, 121 N.Y. 477 24 N.E. 711; Johnson
Service Co. v. McLernon, supra; State v. Ryno, 68 Kan. 348, 74 Pac. 114,

But see Groff v. Groff, 209 Pa. 6o3, 59 At]. 65.
letters are sometimes found to be the work of mere children,
or of practical jokers or other nit-wits or of the insane. In other cases they
are not only of very serious purport but of very ominous import as being the
forerunners of the gravest crimes or attempts. As a general rule it is not
well to destroy anonymous letters, at least where anything serious may be involved, since one anonymous writing may be followed by others, and it is
usually much easier to trace and identify the author of a series of such writing where all of them are available.
64 L.R.A. 303.

'Anonymous

As to the early employment of an expert, see i MARQUETTrE LAw REVIEW
See also Osb. Prob. of Proof, particularly

41, quoting 3 Wigm. Ev. sec. 201.

chapters I, II, IX. Equally important in most cases is the procurement of proper
standards of comparison. This may be a difficult and sometimes a very delicate task as to which the suggestions of a competent expert may be of great
value. Often questioned writings are submitted almost on the eve of trial
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invariable conflict between the findings or opinions of document experts
that is supposed to exist by those who gather their impressions from
newspaper accounts of some close, doubtful, sharply contested, and illreported case. Many cases never reach the courts because of the
absolute concurrence of experts -themselves even where they are employed by opposite sides, and many a forger or other offender has plead
guilty, absconded, or stood practically undefended, for the want of
expert aid as against the facts. Document experts stand in no greater
need of the administration of "truth telling serum""0 or of being "put
under the rule" than do experts of any other class. Unlike the alienists and psychopathists commonly, or the ordinary medical witness in
many cases, the document expert does not usually testify hypothetically in the ordinary or usual sense, but from examination and
comparison of things physically before the court, the facts as to which
are usually capable of complete verification in detail. 61 In many cases
it is both illogical and dangerous to assign his testimony to the category
of "mere opinion." Frequently there is little or no hope of proving the
actual facts save by the aid of experts. The hostile attitude that a few
courts still show toward them tends to impede or obstruct justice as
against the forger and his ally, the perjurer, who often work together
as harmoniously as the fingers of the same mischievous hand in the
perpetration of the grossest frauds or other public outrages or private
wrongs. The courts are increasingly inclined to reclassify and reappraise the testimony of document experts, assigning it in proper cases
to the category of fact testimony, or perhaps more properly to the
category of testimony revealing the unalterable physical facts which
accompanied by standards that are so deficient in number and unsuitable in
kind that it is impossible to base a safe opinion thereon, or demonstrate any
opinion that may be formed, even were sufficient time available for proper
study and examination. See the remarks at the close of the opinion in Plymouth Sa'. and Loan Assn. v. Kassing (2nd App.), 125 N.E. 488.
' See State v. Hudson, (Mo.) 289 S.W. 920 where the court is wittily skeptical as to the existence of any well or fountain from which this remarkable and
much needed serum can be drawn. If it has the virtues claimed for it some
people ought to carry it on the hip.
","The most silent and at the same time the most vociferous evidence proves
to be the tail of a comma .....
Silent circumstances without power to change
their attitude, or to make explanations, or to commit perjury, speak more
powerfully and truthfully in court than animate witness." In re Oliver's Will,
214 N.Y. Supp., 154 (1926).
This case will be found highly interesting even to those in search of mere
entertainment. Probate of the will was refused in Feb., 1926. Win. A. Weeks,
a witness, confessed after conviction of forgery, implicating the other witness,
Nellie Drummond, and Cowles, the chief beneficiary. Sentence suspended for
the others. Cowles pleaded guilty. Eight to fifteen years in Sing Sing.

EXTRANEOUS OR UNPROVED WRITINGS

courts and juries without their aid would be unlikely or powerless to
discover, but which, when properly shown, speaks truthfully a language that all can understand. 62 Contrary to the spirit and pronouncements many of the older authorities, such expressions as "comparison
of hands," or, "mere opinion based on comparison of hands," are no
longer generally used as a sort of dignified legal kuss phrases judicially
employed to express somewhat the same degree of pain, disgust, and
annoyance as "Oh, sugar !" when erupted by a Sabbath-school superintendent who has seated himself on a tack. Some of this impatience
of expert handwriting testimony, hovjever, is still occasionally displayed. 63 However, it is not the purpose of this article even incidentally to sing the orisons of the document experts or shower them
with confetti, but to ask, incidentally at least, that they be accorded
fair and rational treatment. The honest and able among them will
take care of themselves, while the others will usually be adequately
dealt with by the sometimes tardy operation of that law which decrees
4
the survival of the fittest.1
In conclusion attention is called to section 327.22 of our statutes. If
properly invoked this may cast upon a party who denies or refuses to
admit the facts with respect to a document the expense of proving
them, and also to our discovery statutes which it may sometimes be
6
necessary to invoke in handwriting cases. 1

'See the summary to the notes to Baird v. Shaffer, in L.R.A. I9i6D, and
supra, note 33.
See Toll v. Monitor etc. Co., 26 Fed. (2nd) 51, citing i Greenl., Ev. sec.
578 and Iowa cases and Springer v. Hall, 83 Mo. 693. There is nothing in the
opinion to indicate how far the attitude of the court may have been justified.
Compare Green v. Terwilliger, 56 Fed. 384.

' See the recent case of In re Creger's Est. (Okla. 1929), where the court goes
as far as seems necessary in this direction, distinguishing pretty clearly, between
the practical expert who is often a bank teller or small town banker, and the
scientific expert.
The adverse party may be compelled to bring in standards of comparison.
by subpoena duces tecum. See Hancock v. Snyder, ioi W. Va. 536, 133 S.E.
131.

It sometimes happens that the only available or reliable standards are in the
hands of the adverse party, or that having possession and control of standards,
he may produce only such of them as serve his own case. It is also highly
important that study and comparison be made before trial. Discovery and
inspection of standards as well as the disputed writing itself may usually be
compelled before trial in probably all the states. See Wis. Stat. secs. 326, 12, 327
21. The section of the New York statutes corresponding to sec. 327. 21 expressly
sanctions the taking of photographs. See also special statutes in Georgia and
Illinois as to inspection of standards in questioned document cases.

